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Abstract We explore the use of the resource of intra-particle entanglement for se-
cure quantum key distribution in the device-independent scenario. By virtue of the
local nature of such entanglement, Bell tests must be implemented locally, which
leads to a natural decoupling of device errors from channel errors. We consider a
side-channel attack on the sender’s state preparation device, for which the intra-
particle entanglement-based scheme is shown to be more secure than the one that
uses separable states. Of practical relevance is the fact that such entanglement can
be easily generated using linear optics.
1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols [1] allow two distant parties, tradi-
tionally called Alice and Bob, to produce a shared random bit string consisting of
0’s and 1’s known only to them, which can be used as a key to encrypt and de-
crypt messages. Based on fundamental principles such as the quantum no-cloning
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principle [2], QKD provides an unconditionally secure way to distribute random
keys through insecure channels.
While the first QKD scheme to be proposed, the Bennett –Brassard (BB84)
protocol [3] was a prepare-and-measure protocol, which used separable states,
a connection between nonlocality [4,5] and security was first suggested by the
Ekert protocol [6]. The basic intuition here is that Eve’s attack causes a reduction
in the correlation between legitimate parties, which is now understood as due
to the monogamy of nonlocality in non-signaling theories [7]. It is also known
that nonlocality helps security not only in the traditional QKD scenario (where
Eve attacks the channel) but even in the more stringent device-independent (DI)
scenario, where neither the prepared initial states nor the devices are trusted.
Security here must be guaranteed simply via certain statistical checks —typically
sufficiently high violation of a Bell inequality —and without requiring a detailed
characterization of devices [8,9,10,11,12,13].
The nonlocality, and hence entanglement, considered above is inter-particle
entanglement, and the Bell-inequality violating property (i.e., nonlocality) pertains
to the correlations obtained by spatially separated measurements by a sender
(Alice) and receiver (Bob). A different kind of entanglement is that between two
degrees of freedom of the same particle, i.e., intra-particle entanglement. This
has been discussed by Basu et al. [14] in the context of a Mach –Zehnder type
interferometric set-up for demonstrating the violation of non-contextuality. An
experiment using single neutrons was performed by Hasegawa et al. [15].
Here, for the first time, we propose the use of the resource of intra-particle
entanglement for QKD. By its nature, Bell tests with intra-particle entanglement
must be local. Interestingly, such local Bell tests have also been proposed in the
case of bipartite systems for self-testing schemes employed to certify the state
preparation process or the source of quantum states [16,17,18]. Our method also
evokes a comparison with one-sided DIQKD, in which the Alice’s devices are un-
trusted, but Bob’s are trusted [19], and where the statistical check is based on
steering inequalities [20]. An interesting counterpoint here is provided by the sce-
nario of measurement DI, in which, the devices for measurement, rather than that
of the sender, is untrusted [21].
Relative to inter-particle entanglement, intra-particle entanglement is easy to
generate. In the optical case, considered here, linear optics suffices. However, the
local nature of intra-particle entanglement means that it is unsuitable for many
quantum information processing tasks, like quantum teleportation or dense cod-
ing. It is an interesting question whether it is useful for cryptography, which we
answer here in the affirmative. Experimental demonstrations of various QKD pro-
tocols were discussed in [22,23,24,25,26,27]. The practical violation of the Bell’s
inequality in the cryptographic context was first considered in an experiment
by Jennewein et. al. [28], but no quantitative measure of security was derived
from the observed violation. Later, Ling et. al. [29] performed an experiment on
entanglement-based QKD, in which the violation of Bell-CHSH inequality is used
to also quantify the degree of security according to the criterion of Refs. [7,30].
In this work, our accent is mainly on introducing intra-particle entanglement
between position (path) and polarization of photons, as a useful and easy-to-
prepare resource for QKD, which presents novel elements when state preparation
devices, in addition to the channel, are allowed to be insecure. We do so by show-
ing that this QKD is secure against certain “side channels” that leak secret data
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(such as Alice’s or Bob’s settings and outcome information), whereas the corre-
sponding version of BB84 is not secure. Clearly, there is no protection against
an unrestrictedly powerful side channel. Hence, we must assume that it cannot be
“obvious”. Examples of typical side channels are timing information on the devices
used, observations of power consumption or electromagnetic leaks bearing some
heat signature of devices, or even a click sound produced by an optical element. We
quantitatively find that the Bell-inequality violating (BIV) property of the path-
polarization correlations can be used to guarantee security against an individual
side-channel attack, which would render insecure QKD in the standard scenario.
Here an incoherent attack is one where Eve attacks Alice’s particles along the
transmission channel individually and measures them independently, without the
involvement of any joint measurement. Further details, such as coherent attacks,
optical losses in the channel and universal composability are important future
directions of this work, not considered here. An important aspect of using intra-
particle-based entanglement, which we consider in more detail elsewhere [31], is
to generalize the Goldenberg –Vaidman protocol for orthogonal state- based cryp-
tography [32], as a method to thwart general individual and coherent attacks [33]
on intra-particle entanglement-based qudits.
This article is divided as follows: in Sect. 2, we introduce the notion of intra-
particle entanglement and present simple generation schemes for path-polarization
intra-particle entanglement. In Sect. 3, we introduce an augmented key distribu-
tion protocol, suitable for a side-channel attack scenario, in which the sender Alice
must verify the quality of intra-particle entanglement just before transmitting the
particle to the receiver Bob, and after all optical elements used for the encoding
process have been applied. In Sect. 4, an individual attack scheme by Eve is con-
sidered. Her action is to depolarize the initial maximally entangled state into an
intra-particle Werner state, for which the entanglement and BIV properties are
readily known. The condition for secure extraction of secret bits is studied in com-
parison with the availability of these properties in the noisy state received by Bob.
In Sect. 5, we demonstrate the usefulness of intra-particle entanglement in pro-
tecting against a class of side-channel attacks that rely on flaws in certain optical
elements such as quarter-wave plates (QWPs). Finally, we present our conclusions
in Sect. 6.
2 Intra-particle entanglement
Let us consider a photon that is initially polarized along the vertical direction (its
state denoted by |0〉). Taking into consideration its path (or position) variables,
the joint path-polarization state can be written as
|ψ0〉ps = |V 〉s ⊗ |ψ0〉p (1)
where the subscripts p and s refer to the path and the spin (i.e., polarization)
variables, respectively. A photon in the state |ψ0〉ps with Alice is incident on a
beam splitter (BS1), whose transmission and reflection probabilities are |α|2 and
|β|2 respectively, where |α|2 + |β|2 = 1 (cf. Fig. 1).
The reflected and transmitted states from BS1 are designated by |ψR〉 and |ψT 〉,
respectively. Here we recall that for any given lossless beam splitter, arguments
using the unitarity condition show that for the particles incident on the beam
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splitter, the phase between the transmitted and the reflected states of the particle
is pi2 . Note that the beam splitter acts only on the path states without affecting
the polarization state of the particles.
The state of a particle emergent from BS1 can then be written as
|ψ0〉ps → |ψ1〉ps = |V 〉s ⊗ (α|ψT 〉p + iβ|ψR〉p), (2)
where
|ψT 〉p ≡
(
0
1
)
, |ψR〉p ≡
(
1
0
)
|V 〉s ≡ |0〉s ≡
(
0
1
)
, |H〉s ≡ |1〉s ≡
(
1
0
)
. (3)
Our simplest basis, called GA1 , can be generated without using the beam splitter:
|Ψ+〉 = |0〉s ⊗ |ψT 〉p,
|Ψ−〉 = |1〉s ⊗ |ψT 〉p,
|Ψ∗+〉 = |0〉s ⊗ |ψR〉p,
|Ψ∗−〉 = |1〉s ⊗ |ψR〉p. (4)
A basis consisting of path-polarization entangled elements and which is mutu-
ally unbiased with GA1 , is G
A
2 , given below in Eq. (5). It is produced by a linear
optical set-up consisting of a beam splitter, a half-wave plate (HWP), QWP and a
phase shifter (PS). For example, |Φ+〉 is produced from |Ψ+〉, by passing the parti-
cle through a BS1, applying HWP on the transmitted wave packet |ψT 〉p, followed
by the application of QWP on both arms. The HWP has the action |H〉s ↔ |V 〉s.
The states resulting from GA1 by this procedure are:
|Φ±〉 = 1√
2
( |0〉s + |1〉s√
2
⊗ |ψT 〉p ± i |0〉s − |1〉s√
2
⊗ |ψR〉p
)
,
|Φ∗±〉 = 1√
2
( |0〉s − |1〉s√
2
⊗ |ψT 〉p ± i |0〉s + |1〉s√
2
⊗ |ψR〉p
)
, (5)
which form the basis GA2 . The bases G
A
1 and G
A
2 are mutually unbiased in the
sense that any element in either basis is an equal weight superposition (apart from
phase factors) of elements of the other basis.
To measure the state in an arbitrary separable basis (a,b) ≡ a·σ⊗b·σ, where a
and b denote direction vectors of unit magnitude, one passes the particle through
a beam splitter of suitable bias that de-rotates the position to the computational
basis, and then uses two detectors, both set alike to measure the polarization
along a. For example, if b ≡ (sin θ cosφ, sin θ, sinφ, cos θ), the beam splitter is cho-
sen with coefficients of transmission and reflection being cos(θ/2) and eiφ sin(θ/2),
respectively. These coefficients can be set at the time of manufacture by the re-
flection coating applied to a beam splitter, and their ratio determines whether the
element functions as a balanced (50:50) or unbalanced (say 90:10) beam splitter.
The particular measurements basis settings (a,b) we require in order to evaluate
the Bell observable, are given in Eq. (14).
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In dimension d = 4, there are d + 1 = 5 mutually unbiased bases (MUBs).
Another mutually unbiased entangled basis, denoted GA3 , in addition to sets G
A
1
and GA2 , is:
|Λ±〉 = 1√
2
( |0〉s + i|1〉s√
2
⊗ |ψT 〉p ± i |0〉s − i|1〉s√
2
⊗ |ψR〉p
)
,
|Λ∗±〉 = 1√
2
( |0〉s − i|1〉s√
2
⊗ |ψT 〉p ± i |0〉s + i|1〉s√
2
⊗ |ψR〉p
)
. (6)
Two others (separable state) MUBs, which may be denoted GA4 and G
A
5 , can be
produced by applying H ⊗H and H ′ ⊗H ′ to the elements of basis GA1 (4), where
H ≡ 12 (σz + σx), while H ′ ≡ 12 (σz + σy). All these states are easy to prepare,
requiring only linear optical elements.
ALICE
BOB
S
BS1 PS1
HWP
M1
M2
BS2
PBS1
PBS2
D1
D2
D3
D4
arm a
arm b
Fig. 1 BB84 set-up: Alice transmits a state to Bob in one of the bases GAj by suitably applying
the linear optical elements of beam splitters, HWP, QWP and PS. Bob may recombine the
reflected and the transmitted channels at BS2. Finally, Bob performs path and polarization
measurements using the polarizing beam splitters PBS1 and PBS2.
Alice’s states are analyzed in Bob’s system, consisting of a beam splitter (BS2),
followed by polarization analyzer in each output arm. For example, if she sends the
state |Φ+〉 or |Φ−〉, then after emerging from BS2 (cf. Fig. 1), the corresponding
resulting states at Bob’s site are given by
|Φ′+〉 = 1√
2
(i|χ1〉 ⊗ |ψ′T 〉+ |χ2〉 ⊗ |ψ′R〉),
|Φ′−〉 = 1√
2
(i|χ2〉 ⊗ |ψ′T 〉+ |χ1〉 ⊗ |ψ′R〉), (7)
where |χ1〉 = |0〉s, |χ2〉 = |1〉s, |ψT 〉 = 1√2
(|ψ′T 〉+ i|ψ′R〉) and |ψT 〉 = 1√2 (|ψ′T 〉 − i|ψ′R〉).
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3 Protocol
In each of the five MUBs, given by states (4), (5), (6), etc., Alice and Bob designate
basis elements by numbers 0, 1, 2 and 3. We can form different protocols by
considering any two or more of the five bases. It will suffice for us to consider the
protocol P1,2 where only two bases are used, which are GA1 and GA2 . However, any
other pair of MUBs will do. Using a larger number of bases enhances the tolerable
error rate, but is less efficient and experimentally more difficult.
The protocol is as follows. (1) Using mirrors, phase shifters and beam splitters
(Fig. 1), Alice prepares an intra-particle path-polarization entangled states in basis
GA1 or G
A
2 , randomly chosen, starting from the initial input state |V 〉|ψT 〉. (2) Just
before transmission to Bob, but after state preparation, she selects a fraction g of
the states, to verify that their fidelity with the intended output entangled state
remains 1. She may do so by reversing her preparation procedure and observing
the probability eA that the output fails to coincide with |V 〉|ψT 〉. As explained
later, she may equivalently perform a test of Bell inequality violation. This step is
a key addition to the protocol for protection against the side-channel attack; Here
we assume that the optical set-up that reverses the preparation is different from
that actually used for state preparation, though this is not necessary; we note that
the test based on reversing implicitly verifies that the reversed state is separable.
Since an entangled bipartite state is necessarily mixed in any one of its parts, a
test of mixedness may be optionally implemented. If it returns a positive result,
then clearly the output fails to coincide with |V 〉|ψT 〉. (For a particular proposal
for testing mixedness, see Ref. [36]). (3) Alice transmits the remaining particles
to Bob (i.e., no quantum memory is used to hold the other particles while the
Bell test is underway); (4) Bob obtains a 2-bit outcome by using mirrors, phase
shifters and beam splitters (Fig. 1) to measure the transmitted photon, choosing
randomly the measurement basis GBj basis, the ”primed” versions of G
A
j .
The remaining steps involve only classical post-processing: (5) The experiment
described in the above two steps is repeated many times. Alice then declares via
an authenticated classical channel the value of eA and the basis (but not the
basis element) from which she chose the state (The existence of an authenticated
channel between Alice and Bob, which gives Bob an edge over Eve, is essential to
the security of QKD). Bob announces the cases where his basis was mismatched
with hers. The corresponding measurement outcome data are discarded. (6) From
the retained (sifted) measurement data, a sufficiently large portion is divulged by
Bob. The fraction of it that does not agree with her preparation state is an estimate
of the error rate in the key, e. If e is sufficiently low, they proceed with the rest of
the protocol, else they abort it. (7) Alice and Bob perform key reconciliation over
the authenticed channel, to improve the correlation of their respective copy of the
key. They then perform privacy amplification to minimize Eve’s information on
the key.
The verification step in the protocol, which is an augmentation over conven-
tional QKD protocols, makes our protocol more secure in a DI scenario, as we
explain later. With inter-particle entanglement, Alice and Bob perform this step
by using local operations and classical communication (LOCC) to determine the
nonlocality of the state, from which an estimate of the secrecy content follows.
With intra-particle entanglement, only one of the parties (here, Alice) must ac-
complish this, because the path and polarization qubits cannot be measured at
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spatially separated stations. In this sense, Alice and Bob distinguish between er-
rors arising due to the channel (the conventional security scenario) versus errors
arising during state preparation (the side-channel or DI) scenario.
Before discussing detailed security issues, let us make a number of remarks to
qualify the motivation behind this work.
1. Formally, the four-dimensional spin-position entangled states we use for encod-
ing can be considered as superpositions of a ququart (four-dimensional quan-
tum system). However, our point is to study the system as two-qubit entan-
glement because we wish to take advantage of some ideas from DI quantum
cryptography.
2. We consider below (apart from a channel attack) Eve’s side-channel attack only
on Alice’s QWP, and not other optical elements. There is no special reason to
make this choice. Rather, this is meant only as an illustration of the general
principle of how intra-particle entanglement can be more useful that a plain
qubit or ququart superposition. An more detailed follow-up can extend this
principle to other optical elements.
3. Note that the verification step itself can be subject to an attack, for example, to
the particular side-channel attack, we describe below. What this entails is that
Eve can know what Alice knows about Eve’s eavesdropping actions, possibly
introducing further noise. From the viewpoint of enhancing her knowledge of
the final key, this does not help Eve, and we do not consider such attacks here.
4 Security in the conventional scenario
We model Eve’s attack as a simple intercept-resend attack on single particles. Eve
can also eavesdrop their authenticated classical channel and thus make use of their
basis announcements. Eve’s strategy is to measure the particles randomly in one
of the legitimate bases. She forwards the measured state to Bob, and waits until
after their public announcement of bases to find out when she got it right. For
purposes of this section, Eve is assumed to attack only the channel and not exploit
any side channels. Accordingly, the verification step (2) in the protocol presented
above may be omitted.
4.1 A simple individual attack
Without loss of generality, suppose Alice sends the state |Φ+〉 and Eve attacks
fraction f of particles from Alice to Bob. Eve has an equal chance of measuring in
the right or wrong basis. If she measures in GA2 (with probability f/2), she always
obtains |Φ+〉, which she forwards to Bob, without introducing any error.
On the other hand, if she measures in a basis other than GA2 , she finds any
one of the four basis elements with equal probability. She forwards the obtained
state to Bob. After Alice’s public announcement of basis, she is equally unsure of
what state Alice prepared as she is of what state Bob obtained. The error rate e
generated is given by the probability that Alice and Bob, measuring in the same
basis, find the wrong outcome, which is:
e =
f
2
× 3
4
=
3f
8
(8)
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Eve’s average information (symmetrically with respect to Alice or Bob) per trans-
mitted particle is maximal when, during Alice’s announcement of bases, she finds
that Alice’s basis matches hers, and minimal when it does not. In terms of error
observed, her information is:
I(A : E) = I(B : E) = 2×
(
f
2
)
=
8e
3
bits, (9)
in view of Eq. (8). Because of the mutual unbiasedness property between any two
bases, after Alice and Bob have reconciled their bases, Eve’s action induces on any
input symbol m, the output probability distribution P (n) where P (n = m) = 1− e
and P (n 6= m) = e3 . The corresponding Shannon entropy functional is given by
H
(
1− e, e3 , e3 , e3
)
= −(1− e) log2(1− e)− e log(e/3).
Assuming Alice sends all four states in both bases with equal probability, Bob’s
information is given by the mutual information:
I(A : B) = 2−H
(
1− e, e
3
,
e
3
,
e
3
)
. (10)
The condition for a positive key rate is
K = I(A : B)−min{I(A : E), I(B : E)} > 0, (11)
whose sign is determined by Eqs. (10) and (9) [37]. K is the secret bit rate that can
be distilled. The key rate for this situation is plotted as the rightmost curve in Fig.
2. The largest tolerable error rate, which we denote by e2, is about 27 the relative
weakness of Eve’s attack. As we find later, even this weak attack, augmented by
Eve’s access to certain side channels, leads to more stringent bounds (the other
two curves in the same Figure).
By Eve’s interference, she is acting as a depolarizing channel that has the
action:
ρkj −→ E(ρkj ) =
(
1− f
2
)
ρkj +
f
2
I4
4
(12)
where k ∈ {1, 2} labels the basis and j (∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) labels the basis elements. If
Alice transmits an entangled basis element, then the state in Eq. (12) is (up to
local unitaries) a Werner state [38].
Substituting for f from Eq. (8) in Eq. (12), we find Eve’s depolarizing channel
in terms of error rate:
ρkj −→ E(ρkj ) =
(
1− 4e
3
)
ρkj +
4e
3
I4
4
, (13)
4.2 Entanglement considerations
Let the measurement settings on the first and second qubit (i.e., the polarization
and path qubit) be given by the following directions:
a1 = iˆ,a2 = jˆ,a3 =
1√
2
iˆ+
1√
2
jˆ,
b1 =
1√
2
iˆ+
1√
2
jˆ,b2 =
−1√
2
iˆ+
1√
2
jˆ,b3 = jˆ (14)
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K
e
Fig. 2 The secret key rate as a function of error rate e in the conventional attack scenario
(Eq. (10) and, as explained later, the side-channel attack scenario (Eq. (36). The conventional
security scenario is represented by the rightmost curve, which has a positive key rate while
e ≤ e2 ≈ 27%, the largest tolerable error rate in the simple individual attack in a conventional
cryptographic scenario. The leftmost curve represents the above attack augmented in a side-
channel scenario, with Eve’s maximal attack (F = 1
2
in Eq. (38)), with a tolerable error rate of
at most 14.5% for depolarizing action Eq. (13), the noisy state is nonlocal for e < eLR ≈ 0.17
(Eq. (22), first vertical line) and entangled for e < eent = 0.5 (Eq. (23), second vertical line).
Thus the individual attack in the conventional scenario allows secure states that are local,
but which are necessarily entangled. The intermediate curve represents F = 0.6 for which the
region of nonlocality and secrecy coincide.
which are used for evaluating the following Bell inequality
S = E(a1,b1) + E(a2,b1) + E(a1,b2)− E(a2,b2), (15)
where E(a,b) is expectation value of measuring the spin in the directions a and
b in the two particles, respectively. It is well known that for local-realist models,
S ≤ SLR = 2. The correlation for the singlet is given by
E(ai,bj) = −ai · bj , (16)
so that S = −2√2 = √2SLR. The most general separable state is given by
ρsep =
∫ ∫
σ(na,nb)|na〉〈na| ⊗ |nb〉〈nb|dnadnb, (17)
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where
∫ ∫
σ(na,nb)dnadnb = 1 and
na = sin θa cosφa iˆ+ sin θa sinφajˆ + cos θakˆ
nb = sin θb cosφb iˆ+ sin θb sinφbjˆ + cos θbkˆ (18)
The correlations for ρsep can be calculated as
E(ai,bj) = Tr[ρsepσ.ai ⊗ σ.bj ]. (19)
Using equations Eqs. (14), (15), (16) and (17), the upper and lower bound of the
Bell quantity S in Eq. (15) is given by
S =
√
2
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
σ(θa, θb, φa, φb) sin
2 θa sin
2 θb sin(φa + φb)dθadθbdφadφb
⇒ −
√
2 ≤ S ≤
√
2, (20)
so that quantum bound for separable states, Smax:sep =
√
2 < SLR [40].
State |Φ+〉 is equivalent upto local unitaries to a Bell state, and yields the
maximal Bell-inequality violation of 2
√
2 for settings (14), whereas S(I4) = 0.
After Alice’s public announcement of bases, if Bob divides the received states into
sub-ensembles corresponding to each input state, then in view of Eq. (13), for the
|Φ+〉 subensemble, Bob will observe:
S =
(
1− 4e
3
)
2
√
2. (21)
This is nonlocal when 〈S〉 > SLR = 2, or
e <
3
4
(
1− 1√
2
)
≡ eLR ≈ 22.5%. (22)
From Eq. (13), setting
(
1− 4e3
)
> 13 as the necessary and sufficient condition
for entanglement [38] of Werner states by the Peres-Horodecki positive-partial-
transpose criterion [39], we find that Bob’s states are entangled when
e <
1
2
≡ eent. (23)
Since e2 > eLR (cf. Fig. 2), it follows that there are local states that allow secrecy
extraction for both protocols under the considered attack. This will not be true
when the side-channel attack is included.
The corresponding values of S are, from Eq. (13), S2 =
(
1− 4e23
)
2
√
2 ≈
1.36Smax:sep, implying that e2 < eent (cf. Figure 2). In other words, all states
secure under the protocol for the given class of attacks are necessarily entangled.
Since the considered attacks are clearly not the strongest possible for the protocol
considered, this implies that security or secrecy is a strictly stronger condition than
entanglement (in that more powerful attacks will reduce the tolerable error rate,
and thus increase the amount entanglement in the state at the security threshold).
Our above results may be compared and contrasted with corresponding results
obtained in the inter-particle case for the link between nonlocality and secrecy in
quantum mechanics and general non-signaling theories in the conventional attack
and attack scenarios involving untrusted devices [9,34,35,7,30,12].
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5 Side-channel attacks and faulty devices
The peculiar nature of intra-particle entanglement is that simple operations like
application of an optical element on an arm can be an entangling operation. This
property can be useful to protect secrecy in a side scenario. As an example, con-
sider the tiny angular momentum acquired by the QWP through recoil during
its rotation of the photon polarization. Eve may be able to somehow monitor the
vibrational state of the QWP and deduce private information about the settings
used by Alice. Alternatively, Eve may detect a gap in the wall of Alice’s station,
and shine a thin pencil of light beam at some of the optical elements through
the gap and deduce information based on the pattern of electromagnetic scatter.
Worse still, Eve may be the vendor from whom Alice and Bob purchase their opti-
cal elements. Even if the available side channels are weak, Eve may install hidden
”trojan horses” that reveal basis or outcome information to her.
The attack implemented in a QWP can be mathematically modeled as follows:
|b〉|A〉D → |b〉|A〉D (b = 0, 1)
|0〉|P 〉D|0D〉ϕ → |+〉|P+〉D|0D〉ϕ → |+〉|P 〉D|YD〉ϕ
|1〉|P 〉D|0D〉ϕ → |−D〉|P−〉D|0D〉ϕ → |−〉|P 〉D|YD〉ϕ (24)
where |A〉D, |P 〉D correspond to states of the initial absence or presence of some
device (here the QWP) in path D ∈ {R, T}; |P±〉D, the recoiled state of the
device, carrying a small amount of angular momentum acquired when the photon
in a V/H state is transformed into one of the diagonal polarization states |±〉 ≡
1√
2
(|H〉± |V 〉); |0D〉ϕ, |YD〉ϕ are the vacuum state and state of the electromagnetic
leaking channel, produced when the device relaxes back from |P±〉D to its initial
state. The subscript in state |YD〉 indicates a photon in the mode coupled with
device D.
Practically speaking, for Alice to rule out every possible malicious defect is not
easy, if not impossible. What is desirable is statistical tests on performance that
acts like a catch-all check. The usefulness here of nonlocal correlations (or, entan-
glement within quantum mechanics) between measurements by Alice and Bob has
been recognized [9,7,30]. What is interesting is that intra-particle entanglement
also can be useful in this way.
This is at first not obvious. To obtain the Alice –Bob correlations, one of an en-
tangled pair of particles must be transmitted to Bob, following which each particle
is measured separately. With intra-particle entanglement, such spatial separation
is not possible. Moreover, when Alice transmits the particle, all entangled degrees
of freedom in principle become available to Eve, who may thus be able remove
any trace of her tampering the devices. In this work, we suggest that this problem
can be solved by having Alice perform a Bell-inequality test on the particle after
and all her devices have been used (beam splitters, polarizers, measurements), and
just before the particle’s transmission to Bob. Furthermore, because both entan-
gled degrees of freedom are with Alice, she might equally well measure them in
GA2 basis to verify their BIV property. This is accomplished simply be reversing
the preparation procedure and verifying that the output is indeed the input state
|V 〉|ψT 〉.
The attack (24) does not affect elements from basis GA1 , because no QWP is
made use of. On the other hand, any element from the entangled basis GA2 , say
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|Φ+〉, is affected. The below analysis holds for any other element in the basis as
well.
To prepare the state |Φ+〉 ∈ GA2 , Alice inputs |0, ψT 〉 into the beam splitter, and
applies a HWP plate on the R arm to obtain 1√
2
(|0〉|ψT 〉+ i|1〉|ψR〉). Applying a
QWP on both arms R and T , in view of Eq. (24), she effects the transformation:
|0〉|ψT 〉|P, P 〉R,T |0, 0〉ϕ → 1√
2
(|0〉|ψT 〉+ i|1〉|ψR〉) |P, P 〉R,T |0, 0〉ϕ
→ 1√
2
( |0〉s + |1〉s√
2
|0R, YT 〉ϕ|ψT 〉p + i |0〉s − |1〉s√
2
|YR, 0T 〉ϕ|ψR〉p
)
|P, P 〉R,T
6= |Φ+〉|x, y〉R,T |0, 0〉ϕ, (25)
for any |x, y〉. Eve needs to distinguish between the case that the mode ϕ remains
vacuum, and that there is a radiation of a photon.
Let the projector to |0R, 0T 〉 be denoted Π0. Let 〈0|Y 〉 ≡ cos θ in both arms,
so that ϕ〈YR, 0T |0R, YT 〉ϕ = cos2(θ). It is easy to verify that the probability of
observed error upon Alice’s reversing her state preparation is
eA =
1
2
sin2(θ). (26)
This is the probability that, upon reversing her preparation procedure on a given
particle, Alice fails to find it in the original input state |0〉|ψT 〉. We call this the
device error, to contrast it with the conventional error, e, which may be called the
channel error, acquired during the transmission of the particle through the channel.
We will conservatively assume that no new noise above the preparation noise is
introduced during the reversing step.
The reversal is assumed to be implemented through an auxiliary optical set-up.
For quantum cryptography to be a realistic enterprise, we must assume that Eve’s
side channel is passive, i.e., she cannot use this side information to alter any settings
of Alice’s device (otherwise– i.e., if Eve had active access —clearly Eve would be
too powerful for security to be meaningful). In particular, Eve cannot alter Alice’s
readings in this check. Moreover, Eve cannot access the random number generator
Alice used to prepare random states. Thus a side-channel attack of the type (24)
cannot be correlated with the prepared states, and Eve cannot hope to lower the
value of eA as seen by Alice. At best, Eve can find out the value of eA, but ideally
she knows this already, being the adversary who causes the device noise.
We note that this error check is a simple substitute for a Bell test, in that
it effects a measurement that verifies that the particle’s state is indeed |Φ+〉. By
contrast, in the inter-particle case, local operations and classical communication
would be needed, not to mention the difficulty in preparing the entanglement.
What is interesting here, in contrast to the inter-particle entanglement case,
is that the attack (24) can render intra-particle separable states as intra-particle
entangled, again disrupting the correlations, which can be detected in the ver-
ification step. For example, the attack (24) when Alice attempts to prepare the
separable state 12 (|0〉+ |1〉)(|ψR〉+ |ψT 〉) ∈ GA4 instead produces the entangled state
1√
2
( |0〉s + |1〉s√
2
)
⊗ (|0R, YT 〉Φ|ψT 〉p + i|YR, 0T 〉Φ|ψR〉p) |P, P 〉R,T . (27)
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As before, the verification step detects Eve with probability eA. Thus it is straight-
forward to adapt the analysis given below for a protocol where bases {GA1 , GA4 }
are used instead of {GA1 , GA2 }.
For the present protocol, one strategy for Eve would be as follows. She measures
the electromagnetic modes in the basis {Π0, 1−Π0}, where Π0 ≡ |0R, 0T 〉Φ〈0R, 0T |
in the Hilbert space given by span{|0R, 0T 〉, |1R, 0T 〉, |0R, 1T 〉}. The outcome Π0 is
indeterminate, while outcome 1−Π0 deterministically informs Eve that the basis
GA2 was used, and leaves the particle in the state
|Φ+〉 ≡
(1−Π0)|Φ+〉
||(1−Π0)|Φ+〉|| , (28)
with probability
P (1−Π0|GA2 ) ≡ 〈Φ+|(1−Π0)|Φ+〉
= 1− || cos(θ)|Φ+〉||2
= 1− cos2(θ)
= 2eA, (29)
where the last follows from Eq. (26). Thus, the more the deterministic information
Eve acquires, the larger is the disturbance she produces, that Alice can see.
It can be shown that the disturbed versions of the elements in basis GA2 remain
orthogonal. For example,
〈Φ+|Φ−〉 ∝ 〈Φ+|(1−Π0)2|Φ−〉
= 〈Φ+|(1−Π0)|Φ−〉
= −〈Φ+|Π0|Φ−〉
= − cos2 θ〈Φ+|Φ−〉
= 0. (30)
Thus, there exists a projective measurement strategy whereby the elements of the
”disturbed” basis GA2 can be deterministically distinguished.
Since Eve’s attack on any element in GA1 produces no radiative emission, we
have the conditional probability
P (Π0|GA1 ) = 1. (31)
The probability that Eve obtains outcome Π0 is, using Eq. (29)
P (Π0) = P (Π0|GA1 )p1 + P (Π0|GA2 )(1− p1)
= cos2(θ) + p1 sin
2(θ), (32)
where p1 ≡ P (GA1 ), the probability that Alice chooses (an element of) GA1 . By the
Bayesian rule, using Eqs. (31) and (32), we have
P (GA1 |Π0) = P (Π0, G
A
1 )
P (Π0)
=
P (Π0|GA1 )p1
cos2(θ) + p1 sin
2(θ)
=
p1
cos2(θ) + p1 sin
2(θ)
, (33)
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which we denote p10. It may be noted that if p10 >
1
2 , i.e.,
p1 >
cos2(θ)
1 + cos2(θ)
, (34)
which happens when θ > 0, then Eve’s best guess to minimize error in an intercept-
resend attack would be to assume that GA1 was used if her measurement returns Π0.
That is to say that if no radiation leakage is found even with high distinguishability,
chances are that the state sent by Alice was an element in GA1 .
In practice, however, Alice and Bob, could respond to this potential tactic
by Eve this by always using GA2 . To avoid this, Eve responds to Π0 outcomes
by transmitting a random element of either basis chosen with equal probability.
Eve’s full strategy in this attack scenario is that she will use this extra basis
information to improve her guess work in the intercept-resend attack of Sect.
3. If Eve obtains outcome 1 − Π0, she determines the GA2 element obtained by
a projective measurement, and forwards this state to Bob, producing no errors.
When Eve obtains an outcome Π0, she measures randomly in either basis, notes
the outcome state and forwards it to Bob. In this case, she identifies the sent
state correctly if she measures in the right basis: in the GA1 case, there is no state
distortion; in the GA2 case, orthogonality is preserved on account of Eq. (30).
Therefore, the probability she produces an error that can be detected by Alice
and Bob is found, using Eqs. (33) and (32), to be
e = fP (Π0)
1
2
× 3
4
=
3
8
(
cos2 θ + p1 sin
2 θ
)
(35)
in place of Eq. (8), the corresponding error in the conventional scenario. Eve’s
information is, in place of Eq. (10), now given by by:
I ′(A : E) = I ′(B : E) = 2P (1−Π0)f + P (Π0)f
=
8e
3
1 + sin2 θ(1− p1)
1− sin2 θ(1− p1)
,
=
8e
3
1 + 2(1− F )(1− p1)
1− 2(1− F )(1− p1) , (36)
where
F = 1− eA, (37)
where F is the probability of recovering |0〉|ψT 〉, upon reversing and measuring
in the verification step, and taking values between 1 (when Eve does not attack,
corresponding to θ = 0) to 12 (when Eve maximally attacks, corresponding to
θ = pi/2). In the limit of indistinguishability of the radiative leak modes (i.e.,
θ → 0), Eqs. (35) and (36) reduce, respectively, to Eqs. (8) and (10).
In particular, letting p1 =
1
2 , from Eq. (36), we have
I ′(A : E) = I ′(B : E) = 8e
3
2− F
F
. (38)
Eve’s maximal attack in this model corresponds to F = 12 , whereby she fully
distinguishes the side channels corresponding to G1 and G2 (θ = pi/2 in Eq. (26)).
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The corresponding secret key rate (as a function of channel error) obtained by
substituting Eqs. (38) and (10) in Eq. (11) is plotted in Fig. 2 as the leftmost curve.
The highest tolerable error rate, which is the x-intercept of the curve, is about 14.5
as seen from Figure 2, this implies that secure states in this scenario are necessarily
Bell-inequality violating. This is in contrast to the security in the conventional
scenario (the rightmost curve in Fig. 2), where there are secure states that are
Bell-inequality non-violating (0.17 . e . 0.27). The central curve corresponds to
F ≈ 0.6, for which positivity of secrecy rate coincides with the BIV property.
For the attacked state in Eq. (25), the amount of Bell’s inequality violation can
be shown to be B(θ) = 2√2(1+cos2(θ)), so that it follows from Eqs. (26) and (37)
that B = 2√2F . Substituting this in Eq. (38), and allowing for the possibility of
some errors being due to noise rather than Eve, we can bound Eve’s information
from above as a function of Bell’s inequality violation observed by Alice to be:
I ′(A : E) ≤ 8e
3
4
√
2− B
B , (39)
This form may be compared with bounds on Eve’s information as a function of
Bell’s inequality violation in DIQKD with inter-particle entanglement, except that
B is evaluated by Alice, rather than Bob and indicates the level of Alice’s device
error, which in turn indicates the level of channel error that can be tolerated.
6 Conclusions
Our work proposes the use of intra-particle entanglement (path-polarization entan-
glement of single photons) for cryptography using an interferometric setup. Here,
unlike the conventional BB84, the system used is four dimensional and hence one
can have five mutually unbiased bases for encoding. We illustrate its usefulness by
pointing out a type of side-channel attack which it is secure against, but which
renders a BB84-like protocol insecure. Intra-particle entanglement is necessarily
checked by a local Bell test, which leads to a decoupling of device noise from chan-
nel noise. The observed device noise, derived from the local Bell test, determines
the channel error that can be tolerated. Note that error rates and security proofs
have been explicitly given in the paper. We may also stress that, since the use
of intra-particle entanglement allows one to distinguish between channel and de-
vice errors which, in usual protocols, are indistinguishable, this could be of aid in
assessing the security of the protocol when actually implemented.
The present work mainly highlights the usefulness of intra-particle entangle-
ment for QKD. There are a number of prospects for extending this work. The
attack model on the channel can consider more powerful adversaries, for exam-
ple, executing a coherent attack. The eavesdropping scenario can be expanded
from a single untrusted element toward higher DI. Ref. [19] considers the problem
posed by optical losses on the channel, which has remained beyond the scope of
the present work, and is of interest for a practical application. Similarly, the issue
of composability of intra-particle entanglement-based QKD may be studied [42].
Finally, the problem of secure direction communication [43,44,45,46,47,48] with
intra-particle entanglement would be worth considering.
ASM and DH acknowledge support from the Department of Science and Tech-
nology, India (DST) Project SR/S2/LOP-08/2013, and RS for the DST-supported
16 S. Adhikari et al.
Project SR/S2/LOP-02/2012. DH also thanks the Centre for Science, Kolkata for
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